

June 6, 1963

**American Opinion Analysis****U.S. CUBA POLICY**

As many Americans are gaining the impression that the U.S. has "no policy" on Cuba--is doing nothing to get the Russians out--popular satisfaction with the Government's handling of Cuban problems has steadily dwindled.

Rising Dis- Since February, according to the Gallup Poll, satisfaction has diminished from 56% to 45% and dissatisfaction has risen to 35%. Among Republicans a majority (54%) are dissatisfied; and nearly 2 out of 5 Independents (38%) are in that category. Even among Democrats, 24% are now dissatisfied.

Also in editorial comment dissatisfaction has been strongly and frequently voiced, although perhaps not by a majority of all commentators.

Khrushchev Chairman Khrushchev's scheduled visit to Cuba seems likely to accentuate or increase American dissatisfaction with the Cuban situation.

Some Resig- In May Samuel Lubell reported that "nearly half" nation of the people he interviewed in six states felt that "the Russians are there to stay." Some are bitter about this result; others are resigned to the Russian presence, since they view war as the only way to get the Russians out. About half of Lubell's respondents now think Russia would fight to defend Cuba--this is an increase as compared to last February.

While most Americans seem averse to drastic action risking war, they are far from happy about the neighboring presence of Castro and the Russians.

Action Demands Many editors and Congressmen persist in calling Continue upon the U.S. for action. The most frequent suggestions include a quarantine, blockade, embargo--with some saying invasion as a last resort. Some urge "reopening the on-site inspection issue." Most would prefer joint action under the OAS, but in any event--action.

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"U.S. Has No Policy" The "confusion of U.S. Cuba policy" is scored by the Scripps-Howard papers and others. Americans "will keep on wondering about the Cuban situation until the President does something positive and effective," say the Wheeling Intelligencer and Toledo Blade. Papers of "nationalist" outlook are more harsh in their comments.

Present U.S. actions re Cuba are approved, but regarded by many as inadequate to meet the continuing menace. Air surveillance, blacklisting of ships, and declaring that Russian presence is unacceptable--all these are supported.

The Administration's condemnation of exile raids is supported by the great majority of commentators (and of Mr. Lubell's respondents). The Alliance for Progress is also widely approved. But such measures are not regarded as dealing effectively with the threat.

#### Implications for Information Activity

1. The Denver Post suggested that, as a "starter" toward the use of force, the President should "refute forcefully Khrushchev's repeated insinuation that the U.S. agreed not to invade Cuba."
2. The Government needs to make it obvious that it is actively weighing steps to effect the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba. Background sessions with columnists and correspondents might achieve this aim.
3. Some positive proposal before the OAS or UN might achieve the double purpose of demonstrating U.S. determination and making clear the objections or reluctances raised by our allies.
4. Similarly, the U.S. could make an open appeal to our allies to join in such unilateral measures as embargoes.
5. A strong public appeal to Cuban exiles to unite might either produce that encouraging development or reveal more clearly that the exiles are weakened by disunity.
6. The Government should naturally continue to keep Americans aware of the effectiveness of such present measures as surveillance, blacklisting of ships, and joint efforts to deal with subversive activities. But such publicity should be in the spirit of appreciating that neither Government nor people regard these steps as substitutes for getting rid of the menace.

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7. Similarly the Government should find ways to call public attention to the limitations or inadequacies--and also the risks--of various plans which are publicly advanced as panaceas for curing the menace of Communism in Cuba.
8. There should be a constant effort to increase public awareness of the successes of the Alliance for Progress and their significance for the future of the Hemisphere (see POS American Opinion Analysis on the Alliance dated May 24).
9. Need for a bipartisan citizens committee, urging the Alliance as the best means of dealing with the Cuba problem, is greater today than when it was suggested in a POS American Opinion Analysis on Cuba on March 21.
10. Khrushchev Visit. This event, even in anticipation, has doubtless tended to increase public unhappiness with U. S. Cuba policy. Perhaps this visit can be treated in ways to accentuate for other peoples, as well as Americans, awareness of Cuba's position as a Russian satellite.

Perhaps trips by President Kennedy both before and after the Khrushchev visit to various spots in the Hemisphere could make clear the difference between our relations with our neighbors and Russia's relations with Cuba. The President's trips could also highlight successes by the Alliance for Progress.

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